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NOTES
THE ACUSED AS CO-COUNSEL: THE
CASE FOR THE HYBRID DEFENSE
INTRODUCTION
The sixth amendment's guarantee of "the assistance of counsel"
is one of primary importance in the criminal justice process. In Gid-
eon v. Wainwright' the United States Supreme Court held the right
to counsel to be so fundamental to due process that it is incor-
porated by the fourteenth amendment and thereby made applicable
to the states. The Court in Faretta v. California also established
that upon a knowing and intelligent waiver an accused has a right
implicit in the sixth amendment to waive the guarantee of
assistance of counsel and conduct his defense pro se. Under these in-
terpretations of the sixth amendment the defendant may elect to
proceed pro se or with counsel. The question then arises whether an
accused in a criminal prosecution may combine these two constitu-
tional rights and present a "hybrid defense."
The concept of a hybrid defense is one which must be clearly
distinguished from other modes of presenting a defense. A hybrid
defense is one in which the defendant decides that he and his
counsel-either assigned or retained- together will take an active,
verbal part in the defense at trial. Hybrid representation encom-
passes the notion that the accused will generally make the decision
as to the tasks to be performed by each." The role of each might in-
clude conducting voir dire of the jury, examining witnesses, making
arguments, presenting motions, and other acts involved in the
presentation of the defense.
1. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
3. With certain exceptions relating to pleading guilty, testifying, and waiving
trial by jury, the decisions of counsel are binding on the accused in cases where only
the attorney presents the defense. The Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820
(1975), pointed out that "when a defendant chooses to have a lawyer manage and pre-
sent his case, law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding
decisions of trial strategy in many areas." In a hybrid defense, however, the accused is
choosing not to relinquish the management and presentation of the defense; he is
asserting his desire to manage the defense himself with the assistance of counsel.
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Hybrid representation is clearly distinguishable from a purely
pro se defense and from a pro se defense where the accused has
standby or advisory counsel.' When a defendant elects to proceed
pro se he conducts his entire defense with no assistance from an at-
torney. If the defendant fully and properly waives his right to
counsel an attorney filling an active, verbal role may not be forced
upon him.5
Standby or advisory counsel, upon appointment by the trial
court, is present during the trial for the purposes of giving technical
advice to the pro se defendant if he requests it. Advisory counsel
also helps the defendant protect the record for appeal and takes
over the defense if the accused gives up or constructively waives his
pro se right. Advisory counsel may be appointed over the defen-
dant's objection;6 and depending on the court's definition of his role,
will usually not take an active, verbal part in the defense. In addi-
tion, the appointment of advisory counsel, while recommended by
the United States Supreme Court,' is a matter within the trial
court's discretion. If the right to present a hybrid defense is accord-
ed constitutional status it would not be subject to the broad discre-
tion of the trial judge and the attorney's role would be for the
defendant to determine not the court.
The purpose of this note is to examine the concept of hybrid
representation in terms of whether the defendant has a right to
such grounded in federal and state constitutional provisions. After
looking at the status of the law, three methods will be used in sug-
gesting that hybrid representation should be constitutionally pro-
tected under both state and federal provisions. First, the concept of
hybrid representation will be discussed in light of general policy
considerations and constitutional provisions as interpreted by the
United States Supreme Court. Second, the sixth amendment, its
relation to the Judiciary Act of 1789,8 and the effect of these provi-
sions in federal criminal cases on the hybrid defense question will be
examined. Third, the issue will be reviewed with respect to state
4. United States v. Gaines, 416 F. Supp. 1047, 1050 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
5. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835-36 (1975).
6. Id. at 834 n.46. See United States v. Taylor, Docket No. 77-1013 (7th Cir.
January 20, 1978).
7. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975).
8. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1654 (1970)).
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consitutional provisions, especially those of Indiana, and their effect
on this question in state criminal cases.
The following section will show that courts have consistently
ruled that the question of whether a hybrid defense may be
presented is for the trial court to determine in its discretion. This
general rule is found throughout both federal and state court deci-
sions and was unaffected by the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Faretta v. California.
STATUS OF THE LAW
In Faretta v. California' the Supreme Court of the United
States conclusively established that an accused may waive the
assistance of counsel and present his defense pro se. At Faretta's ar-
raignment the trial judge appointed the public defender to repre-
sent him. Well before the trial Faretta requested that he be allowed
to represent himself. The judge granted the request, but at a subse-
quent hearing reversed his previous ruling and reappointed the
public defender. The judge also ruled that Faretta had no constitu-
tional right to conduct his own defense. Throughout the trial the
judge required that the defense be conducted only by appointed
counsel. The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial judge's
ruling that Faretta had no federal or state constitutional right to
represent himself. The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that Faretta had a sixth amendment right to defend pro se.0
The Court's decision ratified a consensus among state and
lower federal courts that there is a constitutional right to proceed
pro se." However, the Faretta decision is also of tremendous impor-
tance to the hybrid representation question. Circuit court cases
which had recognized a pro se right prior to Faretta did so mainly
on the strength of dicta from earlier Supreme Court opinions. 2 The
pro se right and a solid foundation for the recognition of that right
were thus firmly established for the first time in the Faretta deci-
sion.
The Court found the pro se right to have an independent basis
in the sixth amendment.18 Previously the pro se right had not been
9. See note 2 supr&
10. 422 U.S. at 807-12, 836. After the trial judge reappointed the public
defender, Faretta requested leave to act as co-counsel and to make certain motions on
his own behalf. These requests were denied and were not presented for review on ap-
peal.
11. United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. 805, 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
12. See, e.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
13. 422 U.S. at 819.
1978]
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described as being of independent origin in the sixth amendment.
Thus for the first time both the right to the assistance of counsel
and the right to proceed pro se were clearly and independently
recognized under the sixth amendment. Furthermore, Faretta is of
great importance to the hybrid defense issue inasmuch as the opi-
nion reaffirms the Constitution's concern and respect for an in-
dividual's freedom of choice," even if that individual is labelled an
"accused" in a criminal proceeding.
Faretta applied this emphasis on freedom of choice to the in-
dividual's decision whether to use an attorney in presenting his
defense. The Supreme Court held that an attorney may not be forc-
ed upon an unwilling defendant. 15 The clear recognition in Faretta of
an independent pro se right and the emphasis placed on procedural
fairness and freedom of choice would seem to have merited a re-
evaluation of the hybrid defense rule in post-Faretta cases.
However, as this discussion will show, no such meaningful re-
evaluation has as yet taken place.
Both prior and subsequent to Faretta's recognition of a con-
stitutional pro se right, federal and state courts have held with
notable consistency that a defendant has no constitutionally based
right to present a hybrid defense. The United States Supreme Court
has not been presented with the hybrid representation question and
has in fact declined to hear the issue on numerous occasions,"
thereby allowing decisions resting on a variety of grounds to stand.
14. Id. at 833-34.
15. Id. at 819, 836.
16. United States v. Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, __ U.S.
__ (1977); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925
(1976); United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894
(1976); United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940
(1976); United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1059
(1976); United States v. Shea, 508 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1977);
United States v. Condor, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 958 (1970); Duke
v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958); United
States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958);
Braiser v. Jeary, 256 F.2d 474 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 867, re. denied, 358
U.S. 923 (1958); Shelton v. United States, 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.), petition for cert.
denied on motion of petitioner, 346 U.S. 892 (1953), motion to vacate denied, 349 U.S.
943 (1955); United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S.
794 (1944); People v. Richardson, 4 N.Y.2d 224, 149 N.E.2d 875, 173 N.Y.S. 587, cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 943 (1958); State v. Townley, 149 Minn. 5, 182 N.W. 773, cert. denied,
257 U.S. 643 (1921).
17. See notes 18-76 infra and accompanying text.
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Pre-Faretta Federal Decisions on Hybrid Representation
Some federal courts prior to Faretta, while willing to recognize
"the right of an accused to act for himself and his right to have a
lawyer assigned in his behalf," nevertheless required the defedant
to choose one type of defense or the other before trial.'8 These
holdings arose from the belief that the right to counsel and the right
to proceed pro se cannot be exercised at the same time." Relying on
dictum from Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,2 ' these courts
concluded that the two rights were "correlative" and therefore in-
capable of active co-existence.'
Federal courts also found a statutory basis for the rule that
there is no constitutional right to present a hybrid defense. Several
decisions prior to Faretta based the conclusion that the Constitution
does not protect hybrid representation in federal courts on a literal
reading of 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which states: "In all courts of the
United States the parties may plead and conduct their own causes
personally or by counsel." The courts felt that under this statute the
accused has a right to represent himself or to be assisted by counsel
but that he has no right to a hybrid of the two. '
Section 1654 has withstood constitutional attack with respect
to its applicability to the hybrid defense question. In Shelton v.
United States" the defendant was denied hybrid representation at
trial and challenged the validity of § 1654 on appeal. The Fifth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals upheld the validity of the statute and approv-
ed the trial court's action in not allowing the defendant to dictate
the type of defense to be presented.' The Shelton case also
18. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1010 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 794 (1944). See United States v. Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973).
19. United States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006, 1010 (2d Cir. 1943), cert denied,
321 U.S. 794 (1944).
20. "The right to assistance of counsel and the correlative right to dispense
with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms." 317 U.S. at 279 (1942) (establishing the
right of an accused to waive a jury trial without a lawyer's help).
21. "An accused has the constitutional right to be represented ... by compe-
tent counsel and the correlative constitutional right to dispense with counsel and
assume the management and control of his defense pro se." United States v. Du-
janovic, 486 F.2d 182, 185 (9th Cir. 1973).
22. Lee v. Alabama, 406 F.2d 466 (5th Cir. 1969). See, e.g., United States v.
Shea, 508 F.2d 82 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 847 (1975); Braiser v. Jeary, 256 F.2d
474 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 867, re. denied, 358 U.S. 923 (1958); Duke v.
United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958).
23. 205 F.2d 806 (5th Cir.), petition for cert. denied on motion of petitioner,
346 U.S. 892 (1953). motion to vacate denied, 349 U.S. 943 (1955).
24. Id. at 813.
19781
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reflected the third basis for saying that a defendant has no constitu-
tional right to present a hybrid defense: the belief that such matters
are subject to the trial court's discretionary power to avoid confu-
sion.'
Prior to Faretta at least one federal court chose not to rely on
§ 1654 and determined that efficient and orderly administration of
the criminal process required leaving the question within the discre-
tion of the court." In affirming the trial court's denial of a co-
defendant's motion to represent himself" the circuit court stated:
"[The trial judge] may well have thought this would cause delay and
confusion in the trial. We cannot see any abuse of discretion.., nor
any prejudice resulting to the defendants.""5 The use of judicial
discretion to avoid prolonged and confused proceedings thus con-
stituted the third ground for denying hybrid representation.
Federal courts prior to Faretta thus determined that there
were three separate bases for denying the existence of a constitu-
tional right to present a hybrid defense. First, United States
Supreme Court dicta indicates the right to counsel and the right to
proceed pro se are correlative in nature and therefore cannot co-
exist. Second, the language in 28 U.S.C. § 1654 apparently also
reflects an either-or quality in these two rights. Third, it was believ-
ed that the hybrid defense question is properly left for determina-
tion by the trial court. Federal court cases after Faretta show a con-
tinued reliance on these same grounds.
Post-Faretta Federal Decisions on Hybrid Representation
After the Faretta decision the claim of a constitutional right to
present a hybrid defense was renewed in federal courts. Many
defendants argued that hybrid representation was now constitu-
tionally protected, inferring the right existed under a combination of
the right-to-counsel" and right-to-defend pro se holdings.u Although
the Supreme Court indicated its approval of the use of advisory
25. Id. See Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357
U.S. 920 (1958).
26. United States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 957 (1958).
27. In Private Brands the co-defendant requested that he be allowed to repre-
sent himself while the defendant corporation, whose interests were identical to his,
continue with counsel. Thus while technically a motion to proceed pro se, the request if
granted would have resulted in a hybrid defense.
28. Id. at 558-57.
29. See note 1 supra.
30. See note 2 supra.
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counsel, 1 federal courts subsequent to Faretta have continued to
answer the right-to-hybrid defense question in the negative.
United States v. Wolfish' was the first federal case after
Faretta involving the issue of whether there is a constitutional right
to hybrid representation. The court in Wolfish stated that nothing
in Faretta suggests the existence of such a right and cited 28 U.S.C.
§ 1654 in holding that there is neither a statutory nor a constitu-
tional right to present a hybrid defense. The court thus concluded
the trial court had not erred in refusing to grant the defendant's re-
quest to participate as co-counsel" The Wolfish court's reasoning as
to the import of Faretta on the hybrid defense question is consistent
with other federal court decisions."
United States v. Swinton" agreed with the Wolfish court's
assessment of the effect of Faretta on the hybrid defense question.
The Swinton court held there is no sixth amendment right to pre-
sent a hybrid defense on the authority of Wolfish and on pre-Faretta
decisions from the Second Circuit." The district court did not rely
on 28 U.S.C. § 1654, which seems to mandate an either-or choice,"
but instead treated the question as one subject to the discretion of
the trial judge." The court stated that the defendant should be re-
31. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.46 (1975). For a discussion as to
the differences between advisory counsel and a hybrid defense, see note 3-7 supra and
accompanying text.
32. 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 423 U.S. 1059 (1976).
33. Id. at 462. A subsequent case in the Second Circuit did not interpret
Wolfish as establishing a rule which precludes hybrid defenses. United States v. Swin-
ton, 400 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See notes 36-40 infra and accompanying text.
The most recent decision on this issue from the Second Circuit, United States v.
Cyphers, 556 F.2d 630 (2d Cir. 1977), which reaffirmed Wolfish in holding, inter aliC.
that there is no sixth amendment right to hybrid representation.
34. 525 F.2d at 462-63.
35. United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v.
Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1977); Maynard v. Meachum, 545 F.2d 273 (1st Cir.
1976); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.). cert denied, 429 U.S. 925
(1976); United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 429 U.S. 894
(1976); United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940
(1976); United States v. Lang, 527 F.2d 1264 (4th Cir. 1975); Goodspeed v. Estelle, 436
F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. Tex. 1977); United States v. Gaines, 416 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ind.
1976).
36. 400 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
37. Id. at 806.
38. "In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their
own cases personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein." [Emphasis added.] But see notes
122-65 infra and accompanying text.
39. 400 F. Supp. at 806. But see notes 32-35 supra and accompanying text.
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quired to show that the "normal mode of representation" is inade-
quate or inappropriate to justify requesting a hybrid defense.'
United States v. Hill' also held that Faretta does not alter the
established hybrid representation rule. Noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1654
is written in the disjunctive," this court concluded that no statutory
right to a hybrid defense exists. The court then cited Swinton" in
holding that the trial court's discretion, not the sixth amendment,
controls the hybrid defense question."
Thus federal courts adhere to the pre-Faretta rule that no con-
stitutional right to present a hybrid defense exists. In spite of the
Supreme Court's language regarding the nature of the defendant's
procedural rights" and its suggestion of using advisory counsel,"
Faretta appears to have had no effect upon the federal courts' deter-
mination of the hybrid representation issue. The next two sections
will show that with one exception state courts both prior and subse-
quent to Faretta have also uniformly held that there is no constitu-
tional right to hybrid representation.
Pre-Faretta State Decisions on Hybrid Representation Under State
and Federal Constitutions
When presented with the argument that hybrid representation
is protected under the Indiana Constitution, the Indiana Supreme
Court in McDowell v. State'" held that the decision to allow a hybrid
defense was within the discretion of the trial court. Article one, sec-
tion thirteen of the Indiana Constitution appears to provide protec-
tion of a right to hybrid representation. This provision states: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall have the right . . . to be
40. Id. at 807; United States v. Lang, 527 F.2d 1264 (4th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Gaines, 416 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
41. 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975), cerL denied, 425 U.S. 940 (1976).
42. Disjunctive may be defined as "marked by mutually exclusive alternatives
joined by or .. " WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 651 (1961). Sec-
tion 1654 states "the parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by
counsel .... [Emphasis added].
43. See note 36 supra.
44. 526 F.2d at 1024-25. See United States v. Wilson, 556 F.2d 1177 (4th Cir.
1977); United States v. Pinkey, 548 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1977); Maynard v. Meachum, 545
F.2d 273 (1st Cir. 1976); United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 925 (1976); United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 429
U.S. 894 (1976); United States v. Gaines, 416 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
45. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975). See notes 101-21 infra
and accompanying text.
46. Id at 834 n.36. See generally notes 1-8 supra and accompanying text.
47. 225 Ind. 495, 76 N.E.2d 249 (1947).
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heard by himself and counsel."" The defendant in McDowell while
on the witness stand, volunteered incompetent and irrelevant
testimony, and asked if he might ask a question. The trial court in-
formed the defendant his attorney would ask the questions and that
the defendant would only be allowed to speak from the witness
stand in response to those questions.
Upholding this ruling the Indiana Supreme Court stated that in
order to control the orderly progression of the proceedings the trial
court properly exercised its discretion in these situations." Possibly
the court intended to confine its ruling to situations where the
defendant is testifyingu because the court also explicitly applied ar-
ticle one, section thirteen to hybrid defense-type activities:
Under our Constitution, art. I., § 13, appellant had a right
to be heard by himself as well as counsel and in this case
appellant elected to prepare his own specifications of
alleged irregularities . . . and errors of law . . . which his
counsel incorporated by reference in a motion for a new
trial. Appellant also prepared his own points and
authorities and arguments . . . [which] [h]is counsel incor-
porated . . . in the brief after preparing the more formal
parts."
Thus the single Indiana decision on the hybrid defense question
prior to Faretta applied article one, section thirteen only to the ap-
pellate process." The McDowell court refused to apply the provision
to trial procedure and in effect held, consistent with other jurisdic-
tions, that no right to hybrid representation existed.
Thirty-one states in addition to Indiana have constitutional pro-
visions which recognize the right of the accused to be heard "by
himself and counsel,"" or "by himself, by counsel, or both."" Hybrid
48. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13 [emphasis added].
49. 225 Ind. at 502, 76 N.E.2d at 251-52.
50. This hypothesis, however is not born out by post-Faretta Indiana cases.
See notes 166-72 infra and accompanying text.
51. 225 Ind. at 497, 76 N.E.2d at 250.
52. This note examines the hybrid defense question at the trial level. One
jurisdiction has, contra to McDowell, held that whether a hybrid appeal may be
presented is within the appellate court's discretion. Callahan v. State, 30 Md. App. 628,
354 A.2d 191 (1976).
53. ARiz. CONST. art. 2, § 24; ARK. CONST. art. 2, § 10; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 16;
CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 13; ILL CONST.
art. 1, § 8; Ky. CONST. BILL OF RIGHTS § 11; MO. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a); MONT. CONST. art.
3, § 16; NEV. CONST. art. 1, § 18; N.H. CONST. art. 1, § 13; N.M. CONST. art. 2 § 14; N.Y.
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representation would thus seem to be constitutionally protected in
these jurisdictions. With only one exceptions the courts of these
states held prior to Faretta that no constitutional right to present a
hybrid defense existed.
The single exception to the rule that there is no state constitu-
tionally protected right to hybrid representation was stated in
Wake v. Barker." The court in Wake viewed the issue to be
whether a defendant may "make a qualified waiver of counsel under
which he will receive assistance of counsel only to the extent he
specified in his waiver."5 The question was examined from the
standpoint of whether an accused may exercise his freedom of
choice to determine the amount of assistance of counsel he will
receive." The court concluded that a defendant's right to specify the
kind or extent of services his attorney will perform is "embraced
within the right-to-counsel and equal protection provisions of the
federal and state constitutions."" The opinion also indicated that the
trial court's discretion in this matter should be exercised only when
the defendant's actions during the trial constitute a waiver of his
sixth amendment rights.6' The type of defense to be presented is to
be the defendant's choice." This concept of allowing the accused to
determine his counsel's role was not accepted in other jurisdictions
prior to Faretta.
The majority of jurisdictions before Faretta held that an accus-
ed was not entitled as a matter of right to have his defense
presented by himself and counsel at the same time.' Constitutional
provisions which guarantee the accused the right to defend per-
CONST. art. 1. § 6; N.D. CONST. art. 1, § 13; Omo CONST. art. 1, § 10; OKLA. CONST. art. 2,
§ 20; ORE. CONST. art. 1, § 11; PA. CONST. art. 1. § 9; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 7; TENN. CON-
ST. art. 1, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CONST. c.1, art. 10; WIS. CONST. art. 1, § 7.
See LA. CONST. art. 1, § 9.
54. ALA. CONST. art. 1, § 6; FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 16; MA. CONST. art. 1, § 6;
MIss. CONST. art. 3, § 26; S.C. CONST. art. 1. § 14; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
55. Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. App. 1974).
56. Id.
57. Id at 694.
58. See notes 149-65 infra and accompanying text.
59. 514 S.W.2d at 696.
60. Id. at 696-97.
61. Id. at 696. See notes 101-21 infra and accompanying text.
62. Miller v. State, 86 Nev. 503, 471 P.2d 213 (1970); People v. Richardson, 4
N.Y.2d 224, 149 N.E.2d 875, 173 N.Y.S. 587, cert denied 357 U.S. 943 (1958); People v.
Mattson, 51 Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1957); In re Conner, 16 Cal. 2d 701, 108 P.2d 10
(1940). The court in Mattson also expressed the belief that no federal constitutional
right to a hybrid defense existed. 336 P.2d at 945 n.3.
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sonally and with counsel" were held not to protect a defendant's
right to hybrid representation. The decision whether to allow a
hybrid defense was held by the majority of courts to be within the
trial court's discretion."
On the basis of interpretations of state constitutional provi-
sions, state courts before Faretta were very consistent in holding
that no right to present a hybrid defense existed. As the next sec-
tion illustrates, state courts, much like federal courts, were little in-
fluenced by the Supreme Court's opinion in Faretta. Consequently,
state decisions after Faretta show no change in the hybrid represen-
tation rule.
Post-Faretta State Decisions on Hybrid Representation Under State
and Federal Constitutions
After Faretta the Indiana Supreme Court in Bradberry v.
State" was presented with a claim that the federal constitution
guarantees a right to present a hybrid defense. A claim of this right
under article one, section thirteen of the Indiana Constitution was
not presented; thus McDowell v. State" afforded no authority for
the issue. The defendant in Bradberry unsuccessfully attempted to
"supercede" his attorney in the cross-examination of a witness, and
asserted on appeal that his right to represent himself under Faretta
had been denied."7 The Indiana Supreme Court disagreed with the
defendant's contention and stated that no constitutional right to
hybrid representation exists." Faretta" was interpreted to mean
that when a defendant attempts to present a hybrid defense after
63. See note 53 supra.
64. State v. Carr, 13 Wash. App. 704, 537 P.2d 844 (1975); People v. Lindsey,
17 II. App. 3d 137, 308 N.E.2d 111 (1974); Mosby v. State, 249 Ark. 17, 457 S.W.2d 836
(1970); Moore v. People, 171 Colo. 338, 467 P.2d 50 (1970); People v. Richardson, 4
N.Y.2d 224, 149 N.E.2d 875, 173 N.Y.S. 587, cert denied, 357 U.S. 943 (1958); State v.
Townley, 149 Minn. 5, 182 N.W. 773, cert. denied, 257 U.S. 643 (1921); Rehfeld v. State,
102 Ohio St. 431, 131 N.E. 712 (1921).
65. - Ind. - , 364 N.E.2d 1183 (1977).
66. See note 47 supra. Conversly, the McDowell court was not presented with
the question under federal constitutional provisions.
67. - Ind. at - , 364 N.E.2d at 1187.
68. Bradberry v. State, - Ind. - , 364 N.E.2d 1183, 1187 (1977). See
Wallace v. State, - Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 159, petition to transfer denied -
Ind. - , 366 N.E.2d 1176 (1977) (Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
69. "When a defendant consents at the outset to accept counsel as his
representative 'law and tradition may allocate to the counsel the power to make bind-
ing decisions of trial strategy in many areas.' " 422 U.S. at 820-21.
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consenting to representation by counsel, the question of whether to
allow the defense is one of judicial discretion.0
The question whether the Indiana Constitution guarantees
hybrid representation remains open depending on the court's inter-
pretation of the pre-Faretta decision in McDowell v. State.1
However, when faced with the hybrid defense question under state
constitutional provisions, other jurisdictions have held, subsequent
to Faretta, that no such right exists.
Several other jurisdictions subsequent to Faretta have con-
sidered the hybrid representation question under state constitu-
tional provisions. In spite of constitutional language which would
argue for a right to a hybrid defense," state decisions have con-
sistently held that no such right exists."5 The post-Faretta decisions
reflect a belief that whether to allow a hybrid defense is a question
for the trial court's discretion."'
A number of state courts subsequent to Faretta have been
presented with the question of whether the federal constitution
guarantees a right to present a hybrid defense. These courts have
denied such a right consistent with federal cases and the Indiana
Supreme Court's holding in Bradberry v. State.5
The New Jersey Superior Court in State v. McCleary"6 cited
several post-Faretta cases" and stated:
The courts, after considering the effect of Faretta, re-
jected the absolute right of a defendant to a hybrid ar-
70. 364 N.E.2d at 1187. Although made without citation to either article one,
section thirteen of the Indiana Constitution or prior cases, the court apparently intend-
ed for this statement to refer to Indiana as well as federal law.
71. See notes 47-52 supra and accompanying text.
72. E.g., Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 18(a); TENN. CONST. art. 1 § 9; TEX. CONST. art. 1,
§ 10. See notes 53-54 supra.
73. Landers v. State, 550 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (opinion on
state's motion for rehearing); State v. Burgin, 539 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. App. 1976); State v.
Burkhart, - Tenn. - , 541 S.W.2d 365 (1976).
74. Id. People v. Wheeler, 68 Cal. App. 3d 1058, 137 Cal. Rptr. 791 (1977);
Houston v. State, - Iowa -, 246 N.W.2d 908 (1976); State v. Randall, 530 S.W.2d
407 (Mo. App. 1975).
75. See note 65 supra.
76. 149 N.J. Super. 77, 373 A.2d 400 (1977).
77. United States v. Bennett, 539 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 925
(1976); United States v. Williams, 534 F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 894
(1976); United States v. Hill, 526 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 940
(1976); United States v. Gaines, 416 F. Supp. 1047 (N.D. Ind. 1976); United States v.
Swinton, 400 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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rangement, pointing out that the Faretta opinion does not
guarantee such a right as a constitutional mandate.1 8
Faretta has been considered unpersuasive by state courts.
It is clear that both state and federal courts almost uniformly
refuse to recognize any constitutional bases for the presentation of a
hybrid defense. As will be shown, the courts have stated or implied
a variety of reasons and explanations for their positions. A detailed
examination of the hybrid representation question reveals certain
weaknesses in these reasons and explanations, and thus these
reasons do not justify the courts' refusal to recognize hybrid
representation as constitutionally protected. In fact recognition and
implementation of general policies of the criminal justice system
warrant the establishment of a constitutional status for the hybrid
defense.
EXAMINATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE HYBRID DEFENSE RULE
The almost universal rule is that the granting of a hybrid
defense request is in the discretion of the trial court and is not con-
stitutionally protected under either federal or state provisions. The
rationales advanced in support of and in opposition to this position
can be categorized into three general areas.
First, various policy reasons advanced in support of the current
hybrid defense rule and the effect of these policies on the rule are
examined. An examination of the meaning of the Judiciary Act of
1789, its relationship to the sixth amendment, and the effect of this
relationship on the hybrid defense rule is presented in a following
section. Finally, the state courts' reasoning for refusing to recognize
a right to present a hybrid defense under state constitutional provi-
sions is discussed.
The Hybrid Defense and Policy Considerations
The question whether there is a right to present a hybrid
defense involves problems of policy. To insure that rulings of law
will accurately reflect public policy, the criminal justice system
recognizes two basic goals: to protect and insure the reliability of
the guilt-determining process and to insure procedural fairness to
78. 373 A.2d at 401. See People v. Harris, 65 Cal. App. 3d 978, 135 Cal. Rptr.
668 (1977), State v. Pratts, 71 N.J. 399, 365 A.2d 928 (1976); State v. Burkhart, -
Tenn. - , 541 S.W.2d 365 (1976); Junior v. State, 91 Nev. 439, 537 P.2d 1204 (1975);
Stiner v. State, 539 P.2d 750 (Okla. Crim. App. 1975).
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the individual defendant. 9 Both society and the accused have an in-
terest in seeing each of these goals achieved but do not always
agree on the amount of emphasis that should be placed on these
goals or how one should affect the other. Thus these goals tend to
compete with each other.
Questions of policy involve weighing and balancing these com-
peting goals in an attempt to effect the desired policy. This section
presents a discussion of the law of hybrid representation as it
should be affected by the balancing of the various interests and
goals.
Reliability of the Guilt-Determining Process
The interest of insuring the reliability of the guilt-determining
process is found in both society and the individual defendant. This
interest is incorporated into the system by carrying on an orderly
trial which insures the reliability of the guilt-determining process
and is also an end in itself. The means for achieving an orderly trial
may be categorized into three areas: preventing unnecessary con-
sumption of time, preserving the dignity and decorum of the system,
and maintaining an efficient system. Each of these means has been
cited as a justification for denying a hybrid defense.
Consumption of Time
One reason given for the rule which places the hybrid
representation question in the judge's discretion is the belief that
the presentation of a hybrid defense will unreasonably and needless-
ly consume too much time at trial.' Courts may feel the orderliness
of the proceedings will be lost if too much time is consumed. Con-
ferences between the defendant and his counsel,8 ' requested and
79. Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication, 66 YALE
L.J. 319, 346-47 (1957).
80. United States v. Private Brands, 250 F.2d 554, 557 (2d Cir. 1957), cert
denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958); Sheldon v. United States, 205 F.2d 806, 813 (5th Cir.), peti-
tion for cert denied on motion of petitioner, 346 U.S. 892 (1953), motion to vacate
denied, 346 U.S. 943 (1955); United States v. Mitchell, 1006, 1010 (2d Cir. 1943), cert.
denied, 321 U.S. 794 (1944); United States v. Foster, 9 F.R.D. 367, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1949);
State v. Burkhart, - Tenn. - , 541 S.W.2d 365, 370 (1976); People v. Mattson, 51
Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937, 951-52 (1959); Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v.
California and Beyond, 40 ALBANY L. REv. 423, 441 (1976). See State v. Pratts, 145 N.J.
Super. 79, 366 A.2d 1327, 1334 (1975), affd 71 N.J. 399, 365 A.2d 928 (1976). Accord,
United States ex. rel. Maldonado v. Denno, 348 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1965).
81. These conferences could involve, for example, witnesses to be called, ques-
tions to be asked, or motions and arguments to be presented.
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granted continuances to resolve questions or differences of opinion,
and repetitious arugments are examples of characteristics envision-
ed to be part of a hybrid defense. The courts predict the occurrence
of these events and see them as leading to unnecessary delay and
wasteful consumption of time. In addition, courts feel that defen-
dants who are uneducated or lacking in knowledge of the practice of
law will be potentially, though unintentionally, disruptive if allowed
to consume the court's time."
It is clear that a hybrid defense will take more time than a
defense in which the accused has an attorney, and takes no active,
verbal part himself. However, this reason alone would not seem to
warrant denying a hybrid defense." The Supreme Court has sug-
gested implementing a standby counsel procedure for use in pro se
defense cases.u This system is probably used frequently" in those
cases where the defendant asserts his pro se right but would re-
quire as much if not more of the court's time than a hybrid defense.
The scope or importance of standby counsel's role possibly varies
from case to case but even a minimal role will give rise to consump-
tion of time." A defendant might frequently request a recess for the
purpose of consulting with standby counsel; and even if the requests
are infrequently granted the motions themselves will take up the
82. State v. Randall, 530 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. App. 1975); People v. Mattson, 51
Cal. 2d 777, 336 P.2d 937 (1959); Comment. Faretta v. California and the Pro Se
Defense: The Constitutional Right of Self-Representation, 25 AMER. U.L. REv. 897, 915
(1976); Recent Development, Criminal Defendants at the Bar of Their Own
Defense-Faretta v. California, 13 AMER. CRIM. L. REv. 335, 362 (1975). See United
States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se:
Faretta v. California and Beyond, 40 ALABANY L. REv. 423 (1976).
83. The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve
legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in
constitutional adjudiciation. But the Constitution recognizes higher values
than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of
Rights in general, and the due process clause in particular, that they were
designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from the
overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize...
government officials....
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972) (overturning as unconstitutional a state
statutory scheme which deprived an unwed father the custody of his children without
a hearing as to his fitness).
84. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 n.36 (1975).
85. Advisory or standby counsel is probably used frequently because of the
courts' concern with a pro se defense. See notes 87-95 infra and accompanying text.
86. A minimal role might consist of merely giving advice to the defendant
when requested, or taking over the defense if the accused gives up or constructively
waives his pro se right.
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court's time. Further, the prospect of a time-consuming defense is
not confined to advisory counsel or hybrid defense situations.
The concerns of the courts with respect to the consumption of
time involved in a hybrid defense also manifest themselves, perhaps
to a greater degree, in a pro se defense. The unskilled defendant
who represents himself will no doubt consume much time in present-
ing his defense. A pro se defense will likely find the defendant ask-
ing irrelevant questions, making groundless motions, and presenting
irrelevant and repetitous arguments. However, the right to defend
pro se is constitutionally protected under Faretta v. California,' and
it is very doubtful that a trial judge's ruling would be upheld if he
took away the defendant's pro se right merely because he uninten-
tionally consumed too much time in presenting his defense." A
hybrid defense request should not be kept within the judge's discre-
tion and excluded from constitutional protection merely because it
may consume more time than a "normal" defense.
Preserving Dignity and Decorum
A second avenue toward conducting an orderly trial is the
preservation of the "dignity and decorum" of the court and the
criminal justice system." Preserving this dignity will tend to create
an atmosphere more conducive to the administration of an orderly
trial and thereby make the guilt-determining process more reliable.
In addition, the proceedings are of such importance to the defendant
and to society that there is a need for society to believe that the
criminal justice process is conducted with dignity and decorum. In
partial response to these needs appellate courts have determined
that placing the hybrid representation question under the discretion
of the trial court will help preserve the desired dignity and
decorum.
Some courts perceive the hybrid defense to be a vehicle for an
accused to be disruptive, either intentionally or unitentionally, and
thereby compromise the dignity of the proceedings." Even if pro-
87. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
88. The right to defend pro se was qualified by the Court in Faretta only in-
sofar as it requires a knowing and intelligent waiver of full representation by counsel.
The opinion nowhere implies that a defendant may lose his pro se right if he uninten-
tionally consumes too much time in exercising it.
89. United States v. Condor, 423 F.2d 904 (6th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 958
(1970); Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir.), cerL denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958);
Casenote, Criminal Procedure: Problems of Self-Representation and the Hybrid
Defense, 45 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 130 (1976).
90. Id. See Goodspeed v. Estelle, 436 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D. Tex. 1977). Accord
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
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ceeding with co-counsel, an unskilled defendant trying to take a ver-
bal part in his defense will obviously detract from the decorum of
the proceedings."' In addition, a defendant who consciously wishes to
disrupt his trial may seize the opportunity to do so if given the
chance to speak. There are three possible responses to this reason-
ing.
First, recognizing hybrid representation as constitutionally pro-
tected should not operate to prevent the court from maintaining the
proper amount of dignity. The judge would not lose control of the
proceedings-he would only lose the power in most cases to deter-
mine the type of defense to be presented. The defendant would still
most certainly be subject to the sanctions of the court if he were to
become intentionally disruptive."
Second, an accused who intentionally disrupts the proceedings
would very likely do so regardless of the type of defense presented.
With this type of defendant disruption might only be prevented or
avoided by removing the defendant from the courtroom."
Finally, a defendant who is fully allowed to choose a hybrid
defense if he desires may feel less fearful of the criminal justice
system knowing that he has chosen the defense. He may not be so
quick to conclude that he is being "railroaded" by the system, and
thus his respect for the system may increase. The defendant is more
likely to disrupt the proceedings if he is disrespectful of the system
which effects those proceedings. Thus, the dignity and decorum of
the proceedings would still be preserved if the defendant can choose
a constitutionally protected hybrid defense.
Maintaining An Efficient System
The fear that a hybrid defense will lead to inefficiency is
another reason given for placing this question in the discretion of
the trial judge. This inefficiency is thought to occur in the actual
presentation of the hybrid defense. A proceeding where the accused
91. The defendant's co-counsel will not be able to instruct or advise the defen-
dant so completely before trial that the defendant will be capable of participating as
ably as an attorney. But see notes 95-96 infra and accompanying text.
92. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970) (holding that the defendant may con-
structively waive his sixth amendment right to confrontation if he becomes unruly).
93. This procedure is not prohibited under the Constitution. IdM Removal of an
unruly defendant in a hybrid defense would also result in fewer administrative pro-
blems than the same situation when the defendant is proceeding pro se. If the defen-
dant has active co-counsel, the attorney could continue with the presentation of the
defense after the defendant has been removed.
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acts as co-counsel is considered to be too complicated and confusing
and thus disruptive and not conducive to an orderly trial."
There is good reason to believe that a hybrid defense will be
more complicated or confusing than a defense presented solely by an
attorney, but this would not necessarily make the proceedings or
the defense less capable of being efficiently administered. Following
the line of reasoning which keeps the hybrid defense question under
the discretion of the trial court, pro se defenses should also be
precluded. If hybrid representation is denied in order to avoid confu-
sion and complication because attorneys are not exclusively handling
the proceedings, then pro se defenses should be denied for the same
reason. The pro se defendant may have no attorney to assist him.
The trial court does not have to appoint advisory counsel in a
pro se case, and should advisory counsel be appointed, the pro se
defendant may refuse any assistance from him. If an inexperienced
lay defendant attempts to practice criminal law with no help from
an attorney one can easily envision the inefficiency which would
result. If the efficiency of the proceedings is to be given such a para-
mount value then pro se defenses should be prohibited.
However, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that
efficiency is not the only factor to be considered in determining an
accused's procedural rights. The Court in Faretta held, consistent
with notions of fairness, that a defendant totally lacking in legal ex-
perience nevetheless has a sixth amendment right to actively and
verbally participate in the proceedings." In other words, he may
choose to represent himself apparently regardless of how much
"inefficiency" his choice brings to the proceedings.' If efficency is
an issue and if the defendant may force the system to tolerate the
inefficiency resulting from a pro se defense then he should be able
to demand a hybrid defense which would very likely bring greater
efficiency to the proceedings.
94. See, e.g., United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 1160, 1176 (5th Cir. 1977);
Duke v. United States, 255 F.2d 721, 728 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 357 U.S. 920 (1958);
State v. McCleary, 149 N.J. Super. 77, 373 A.2d 400 (1977). See United States v.
Private Brands, 250 F.2d 554 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 957 (1958); ABA
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE FUNCTION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE 87 (Approved Draft 1972)
(Approved by House of Delegates July, 1971); Recent Development, Faretta v. Califor-
nia, 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 449, 465 (1976); Casenote, Criminal Procedure: Problems of
Self-Representation and the Hybrid Defense, 45 U.M.K.C.L. REv. 130, 133 (1976).
95. 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).
96. See note 88 supra.
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The attorney in a hybrid defense would lend stability and
therefore the desired efficiency to the proceedings. He will be able
to assist the defendant with complicated and confusing substantive
and procedural problems. This should help the court and the jury
deal with these problems, thereby making the proceedings capable
of being more efficiently administered than a situation where the
defendant proceeds pro se.
A'hybrid defense should be preferred over a pro se defense as
a means of achieving efficiency in another way which will greatly
assist the trial judge. The accused who defends himself pro se is not
entitled to any help or advice from the court," yet the court should
require the accused to conform to the same rules of evidence and
procedure that attorneys are obliged to follow." The judge may
quite reasonably feel obligated to assist the defendant in various
ways, such as suggesting possible defenses, questions, or tactical
maneuvers." Although the trial court's ultimate responsibility is to
insure justice to both parties,1" giving active assistance to the pro
se defendant compromises the trial court's role. Allowing the accus-
ed to choose a hybrid defense will largely eliminate this problem.
Presentation of a hybrid defense should remove any extra
burden or obligation the judge perceives with respect to guarding
the defendant's rights. The judge would be able to assume that the
defense has been adequately prepared. If the defendant overlooks or
is not aware of some evidentiary rule or procedural right the court
can justifiably rely on counsel to assist or educate the defendant in
these matters. If the defendant has chosen a hybrid defense neither
he nor his co-counsel should be able to rely on any assistance from
the judge while the defendant is participating in the proceedings.
97. United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975); Michener v.
United States, 181 F.2d 911, 918 (8th Cir. 1950); Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d
665, 670 (9th Cir. 1949); Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se: Faretta v. California and
Beyond, 40 ALBANY L. REv. 423, 440-41 (1976); Recent Development, Crminal Defen-
dants at the Bar of Their Own Defense-Faretta v. California, 13 AmER. CuM. L. REv.
335, 362 (1975). See Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 510 (1962).
98. United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Dujanovic, 486 F.2d 182 (9th Cir. 1973); State v. Randall, 530 S.W.2d 407 (Mo. App.
1975); People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 499 P.2d 489, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233 (1972), cert.
denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
99. Grubbs v. State, 255 Ind. 411, 419, 265 N.E.2d 40, 45 (1970) (Arterburn, J.,
concurring); Comment, Faretta v. California and the Pro Se Defense: The Constitu-
tional Right of Self-Representation, 25 AMER. U.L. REv. 897, 917 (1976).
100. United States v. Trapnell, 512 F.2d 10, 12 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Grubbs v. State, 255 Ind. 411, 416, 265
N.E.2d 40, 43 (1970).
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The judge will then not be torn between his obligation to remain
essentially impartial and his desire to actively help insure pro-
cedural fairness to the accused. Removing this perceived burden
from the trial judge will make the proceedings more efficient.
If the type of defense allowed is to be determined solely by
how much efficiency will result then a pro se defense request
should, like a hybrid defense, be subject to the trial court's discre-
tion. Denying a hybrid defense because of anticipated inefficiency
logically requries denying a pro se defense for the same reason. The
Faretta case held, however, that the right to a pro se defense is
guaranteed under the sixth amendment and is not subject to effi-
ciency standards. In addition, allowing a pro se defendant to employ
active co-counsel will make the proceedings less confusing and will
remove any extra burden felt by the trial judge in a pro se defense
case. Therefore, the desire for efficiency, or a fear of inefficiency,
does not constitute a legitimate reason for refusing to recognize a
right to present a hybrid defense.
Procedural Fairness to the Individual
A counterpart to the goal of achieving reliability in the guilt-
determining process is the goal of insuring procedural fairness to
the individual. With respect to the sixth amendment and especially
its "right-to-counsel" clause, the United States Supreme Court in the
past half-century has placed a great deal of emphasis on the notion
of achieving reliability in the criminal justice system by carefully
guarding the defendant's right to procedural fairness or "due pro-
cess."' Insuring procedural fairness involves recognition of and em-
phasis on the defendant's freedom of choice and personal autonomy.
Procedural fairness can be achieved and the defendant's freedom of
choice respected by recognizing a constitutional right, implicit in the
sixth amendment, to present a hybrid defense.
Faretta v. California expressly emphasized the importance of
the accused's freedom of choice in holding that counsel may not be
forced upon an unwilling defendant and in recognizing a constitu-
tional right to proceed pro se.1" The Court acknowledged 1" those
101. See note 104 infra. Implicit in this discussion is the concept of incorpora-
tion, whereby the rights included in the Bill of Rights are deemed so fundamental to
due process that they are made applicable to the states by incorporation in and
through the fourteenth amendment.
102. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
103. Id at 832-33.
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cases which set forth the thesis that the help of a lawyer is essential
to insure a fair trial,1 ' but stated:
[I]t is one thing to hold that every defendant, rich or poor,
has the right to the assistance of counsel, and quite
another to say that a State may compel a defendant to ac-
cept a lawyer he does not want.
[W]hatever else may be said of those who wrote the Bill of
Rights, surely there can be no doubt that they understood
the inestimable worth of free choice.1 5
The Court noted that the notion of freedom of choice is found
throughout "the constitutional design of procedural protections."",
That an individual's freedom of choice is of great importance is
evidenced in the sixth amendment itself, which speaks of the rights
as being personal to the accused."' The Court in Faretta pointed out
that the defendant bears the personal consequences of a conviction,",
therefore he must have the freedom to personally decide whether
the use of counsel is to his advantage. Respect for the individual re-
quires that his choice be honored even if it operates to his
detriment.'"
The notion that the defendant's rights are personal in nature
convinced the Court that no matter how disastrous the choice might
104. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1948); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932).
105. 422 U.S. at 833-34.
106. Id. at 834 n.45.
107. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him;
to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
108. 422 U.S. at 834. Contra, 422 U.S. at 836 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
109. 422 U.S. at 834. See Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886, 891 (5th Cir.
1977), where, in the context of holding that denial of an accused's pro ae right was not
harmless error, the court pointed out:
[W]e recognize the defendant's right to defend pro se not primarily out of
the belief that he thereby stands a better chance of winning his case, but
rather out of deference to the axiomatic notion that each person is
utlimately responsible for choosing his own fate, including his position
before the law.
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prove to be the defendant must be allowed to represent himself if
he so chooses. Choosing to defend pro se -a right which is recogniz-
ed out of procedural fairness to the individual-could by itself result
in disastrous consequences to the defendant and would also place in
jeopardy the reliability of the guilt-determining process."'
Recognizing a right to choose hybrid representation will pro-
tect both the individual's freedom of choice and the reliability of the
guilt-determining process. If the defendant has a sixth amendment
right to choose a pro se defense, which carries with it such potential
for impeding achievement of the system's goals, he should also have
a constitutionally protected right to choose a hybrid defense which
is much more likely to insure the protection of these goals. The ac-
cused will be much less likely to effectively help bring about his own
conviction"' if he has a lawyer to actively assist him in presenting
the defense.
Recognition of the personal character of the individual's pro-
cedural rights has occurred in the context of the right to waive trial
by a jury. The United States Supreme Court in Adams v. United
States ex rel. McCann" ' held that the accused has the right to waive
trial by jury. While subject to the approval of the trial court, the ac-
cused may waive this right "in the exercise of a free and intelligent
choice" without the assistance of an attorney."' The Court noted
that the accused makes the choice after deciding what is best for
himself."' Procedural fairness to the individual is achieved by
recognizing the defendant's right to make his choice personally. This
personal right of the accused to make procedural choices should be
extended to cover a right under the sixth amendment to choose the
type of defense to be presented.
If the court refuses to allow a hybrid defense the defendant
must choose from two alternatives, neither of which meets the
defendant's needs. He must decide to accept either no assistance of
counsel or full representation by counsel. If he chooses the latter
alternative counsel is interjected into the defense to the degree that
the attorney can no longer legitimately be considered an assistant
the accused does not really want this much aid.
110. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 836 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissent-
ing).
111. See note 109 supra.
112. 317 U.S. 269 (1942).
113. I& at 275.
114. I& at 276.
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The imprecise nature of the "right-to-counsel" clause of the
sixth amendment also supports this notion. The amendment
guarantees the "assistance of counsel,""6 and as the Court in Faretta
remarked: "[An assistant, however expert, is still an assistant.""'
However, under the present law of hybrid representation the trial
court has discretion to force an all-or-nothing choice on the accused
and thereby change the ordinary meaning of "assistance."
Given the meaning of "assistance,""'1 perhaps the concept of a
criminal defense should be viewed as a spectrum of degrees or
amounts of assistance given by counsel. On one end of this line
would be full representation by counsel, on the other, the pro se
defense. Under United States Supreme Court interpretations of the
sixth amendment the defendant may choose either end of the spec-
trum as a matter of right. However, under the present hybrid
representation law his freedom to choose any other degree of
assistance is curtailed to the point of being subject to the discretion
of the trial court. Arguably, two distinct constitutional rights are in-
volved. One, the right to the assistance of counsel, is explicitly
stated in one clause of the sixth amendment. The other, the right to
represent oneself, does not flow from that same clause but is im-
plied by the sixth amendment as a whole. Given the apparent
separate origin of these two rights it is totally incongruous to tell
the defendant his freedom to assert one or the other exists as a mat-
ter of right, but his freedom to choose both is subject to the whim of
the trial court. The accused's freedom to choose a hybrid
defense-to choose self-representation and the assistance of
counsel-should be recognized as constitutionally protected, and not
subject to the trial court's discretion.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the right to defend pro
se and the right to defend with an attorney's assistance are not in-
dependent. In fact, the Supreme Court's analysis of the sixth amend-
ment in Faretta v. California"' implies that these two rights are ac-
tually subparts of a broader, more general right-the right to make
a defense. The Court referred with approval to a court of appeals'
statement that the sixth amendment implicitly guarantees " 'the
right of the accused personally to manage and conduct his own
115. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
116. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975).
117. Assistance may be defined as: "the act or action of assisting, aid, help;
the help supplied or given: support." WEBSTzn's THiRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DIC-
TIONARY 132 (1963).
118. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
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defense in a criminal case.' ",119 In establishing the right to defend
pro se the Faretta opinion recognized that "[t~he sixth amendment
does not provide merely that a defense shall be made for the accus-
ed; it grants to the accused personally the right to make his
defense."'"
Viewing the amendment in this manner the right to defend pro
se and the right to be defended by an attorney are two methods
thus far recognized by which an accused may make his defense. The
hybrid defense would be an additional alternative method for
presenting a defense under the sixth amendment. In choosing to de-
fend by counsel, pro se, or with a hybrid defense, the accused would
only be choosing from alternatives that should be open to him in
presenting his defense. This analysis is completely consistent with
the Supreme Court's definition of an attorney as "an aid"-"like the
other defense tools." ' Thus even if the pro se defense and the
"standby-counsel" defense are not two distinct rights but are actually
two protected methods of asserting the broader sixth amendment
right to personally make a defense, incongruity would clearly result if
no alternative method -especially one which combines characteristics
of the others - were protected under the sixth amendment.
Applicability of 28 U.S. C. § 1654 to the Hybrid Representation Issue
In finding that hybrid representation is not constitutionally
protected several federal courts have emphasized a historical
analysis of the sixth amendment in conjunction with 28 U.S.C. §
1654.1" A tension exists between § 1654 and the sixth amendment as
those two documents have been and are presently interpreted.
First, § 1654 was not intended to be applicable to the question of
whether an accused may present a hybrid defense. Second, if the
statute was applicable prior to Faretta v. California that decision ef-
fectively overrides application of § 1654 to the hybrid defense ques-
tion. Third, even if the statute remains applicable the language of
the statute and Supreme Court interpretations of the sixth amend-
ment indicate that an either-or interpretation is inaccurate. Finally,
if the either-or interpretation of § 1654 is proper then hybrid
defenses should never be allowed, and the accused is forced to
119. Id at 817, citing United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir.
1964).
120. 422 U.S. at 818-19.
121. Id at 820 [emphasis added]. See note 117 supra.
122. Judiciary Act, ch.20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1654 (1970)).
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forego the assertion of one constitutional right in order to assert
another.
The basic syllogism of the courts in applying § 1654 is this: the
sixth amendment and its interpretations do not reach the question
of hybrid representation; § 1654 apparently indicates that the defen-
dant must either represent himself or be represented by an at-
torney; therefore § 1654 precludes hybrid representation in federal
courts. The validity of this argument must be examined in light of
the intent of the two provisions.
The original language of § 35 of the Judiciary Act reads:
[I]n all courts of the United States, the parties may plead
and manage their own causes personally or by the
assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the
rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to
manage and conduct causes therein."'
The present form of the provision is:
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead
and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as,
by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to
manage and conduct causes therein."'
Thus § 1654 remains, with one exception, substantially unchanged
from its forerunner. When the act was amended in 1948 the
words-"the assistance of such"-were deleted apparently without
explanation" and: have not been replaced.'" The right-to-counsel
clause of the sixth amendment remains unchanged from its original
form.
The Bill of Rights and the Judiciary Act were passed
simultaneously by the First Congress."= Although it is "difficult, if
123. Id. Section 35 goes on to create the offices of United States Attorneys, At-
torney General of the United States, and the duties of each.
124. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970).
125. With respect to this clause, research indicates only that "changes were
made in phraseology." H.R. REP. No. 2646, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. A 139 (1948).
126. Public Laws, ch.646, § 1654, 62 Stat. 944 (1948); ch.139, § 91, 63 Stat. 103
(1949) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970)).
127. Several judicial opinions and scholarly works have incorrectly stated that
the Judiciary Act was passed the day before the Bill of Rights was proposed. Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 831 (1975); Chapman v. United States, 553 F.2d 886 (5th Cir.
1977); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1122-23 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United
States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964); Recent Developments, Faretta v.
California. 4 HOFSTRA L. REv. 449, 467 (1976); Case Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se
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not impossible with the available material, to reach any positive con-
clusion concerning the intention of Congress in proposing the [sixth
amendment right-to-counsel] clause, ' " it is arguable that § 35 of the
Judiciary Act and the sixth amendment were not intended to be
contradictory with respect to the two provisions which speak to the
use of counsel.1"
The language of the entire Judiciary Act shows that the clause
in question has received undue emphasis in the consideration of the
hybrid defense question. This becomes apparent when the statute is
compared with the language of the Bill of Rights. When looking at
the Judiciary Act this clause of § 35 appears as only a small part of
the whole. The Act was one "to establish the Judicial Courts of the
United States" and contains thirty-five sections relating to the crea-
tion and operation of the federal court system."M On the other hand,
the provisions of the Bill of Rights deal primarily with the rights of
individuals with respect to the government.' It is therefore doubt-
ful that the import of § 35 has to do with the amount of legal
assistance an accused may have.
More probable, the importance of the first sentence of § 35 is
to be found in the requirement that when counsel is employed, he
must conform to the rules of the court in which the case is being
heard." This is clear from congressional action in amending the sec-
tion. When the statute was amended in 1948 the words-"as by the
in Criminal Proceedings-Faretta v. California, 37 OHIO St. L.J. 220, 222 (1976). Presi-
dent Washington signed the Judiciary Act into law on September 24, 1789. The same
day the House of Representatives passed the Bill of Rights in its final form, with the
Senate following suit the next day. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS -A DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY 1159, 1162-65 (1971) [hereinafter cited as SCHWARTZ]. However, James
Madison introduced the Bill of Rights, including what was to become the sixth amend-
ment, to the First Congress on June 8, 1789. 2 SCHWARTZ, supra at 1016.
128. W. BEANEY. THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 24 (1955). There
was apparently no discussion as to this portion of the amendment. See 2 SCHWARTZ,
supra note 127, at 1006-1166.
129. This assumption would seem obvious, given the very close proximity in
time of the passage of the two documents, the relatively small size of the House and
Senate, and the intelligence of the majority of members of the two houses.
130. See note 120 supra.
131. U.S. CONST. amend. I-X.
132. [I]n all the courts of the United States, the parties may plead and
manage their own causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel
or attorneys at law as by the rules of the said courts respectively shall be
permitted to manage and conduct causes therein.
Judiciary Act, ch.20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1654
(1970)) [emphasis added].
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rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage
and conduct therein"-were removed as "surplusage."1 8 Section
1654 then read: "In all courts of the United States, the parties may
plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel."
If, as some federal courts have indicated, the impact of § 1654
lies in this sentence by itself then no further modification or revi-
sion would have been necessary. However, the clause containing the
requirement that counsel conform to the court's local rules was plac-
ed back into the statute just one year later in almost identical
language. This action on the part of Congress clearly indicates that
this clause constitutes the important part of § 1654.
The subject matter of the entire Judiciary Act and the
language of § 1654 combined with the legislative history of this sec-
tion support the conclusion that § 1654 should have little applicabili-
ty to the hybrid defense question. If this conclusion is correct, and
because the right to defend pro se and the right to counsel are now
both constitutionally protected, the hybrid defense question should
be decided according to constitutional rather than statutory stan-
dards.
The Court in Faretta pointed out that the concept of pro se
representation has roots in many state constitutions and other
documents recognizing an accused's fundamental rights. It was
noted that if the right to counsel provision of the sixth amendment
had been thought to preclude the right to self-representation much
discussion would surely have resulted. ' Under Faretta these two
rights have had constitutional bases since the adoption of the sixth
amendment.
Thus the statutory right to appear pro se given by § 1654 has
via Faretta been elevated by the Supreme Court to constitutional
status. If the accused so desires, and upon a valid waiver, he cannot
be denied this course of action. After Faretta it appears that the on-
ly portion of 28 U.S.C. § 1654 which has not been elevated by the
Supreme Court to the constitutional level subjects counsel to the
specific rules of the various federal district and circuit courts. This
is additional support for the proposition that this clause constitutes
an important part of § 1654, and that the first clause should not be
applied to the hybrid defense question.
133. See note 125 supra.
134. See note 126 supra.
135. 422 U.S. at 831-32.
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Nevertheless, the first portion of § 1654 is still held to control
to the end that, through application of the word "or,"", the defen-
dant is required to elect between using counsel and proceeding pro
se in his defense.' Thus the courts are effectively determining that
a statute must control the assertion of constitutional rights. The
defendant may assert either right because both are guaranteed by
the sixth amendment, but courts are holding that a statute-28
U.S.C. § 1654-indicates he may not assert these rights at the same
time.
Even if after Faretta § 1654 is applicable to the question
whether a defendant may act as his own co-counsel, the statute does
not necessarily merit this "either-or" interpretation. If it had been
the intent of the Framers to establish an all-or-nothing stance as to
the amount of assistance a defendant may employ, the provision
would have been more explicitly worded so as to indicate "either
one or the other, but not both."' " The statute in its original form
says "the parties may plead and manage their own causes personally
or by the assistance of ... counsel."'" A logical construction of this
would be: a party may manage his cause personally or he may
manage his cause with the assistance of counsel. Under this view
the first clause would merely be restating accepted law"'-that a
party may represent himself-while the second clause would be
restating the sixth amendment protection of the right to the
assistance of counsel."' This interpretation would indicate Congress
did not intend this clause of § 35 to establish mutual exclusivity in
these two rights. Nevertheless, some federal courts consider the two
rights to be correlative and therefore mutually exclusive, and thus
adhere to an either-or approach. However, there are additional, con-
stitutional grounds for rejecting this either-or interpretation of the
right to counsel and the right to defend pro se.
The Court in Faretta found the right to self-representation im-
plicit in the structure of the sixth amendment as a whole, not mere-
ly in the "assistance of counsel" clause."' That amendment was in-
136. The statute reads: "plead and manage their own cases personally or by
counsel .. " 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) [emphasis added].
137. See notes 16-44 supra and accompanying text.
138. See Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal Trials: The Dilemma of
the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALiF. L. REv. 1479, 1489 (1971).
139. Judiciary Act, ch.20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (1789) (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1654 (1970)).
140. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 826-32 (1975).
141. United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964).
142. 422 U.S. at 817-18.
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terpreted to constitute more than "legal formalisms"l' which re-
quire that a defense be made for the accused; "it grants to the ac-
cused personally the right to make his defense."1" Thus since the
right to proceed pro se does not derive solely from the assistance of
counsel clause it should be considered an independent right, and not
"correlative" to the right to counsel. ' The two rights would not be
mutually exclusive but mutually independent in operation; that is,
the assertion of one should not operate to logically require the
defendant to forego the other.
The right-to-counsel clause was intended to supplement the
idea of an accused making his defense personally. That clause
speaks of the "assistance" of counsel, and an assistant,
however expert, is still an assistant. The language and
spirit of the sixth amendment contemplate that counsel,
like other defense tools guaranteed by the amendment,
shall be an aid to a willing defendant .... I"
The Faretta court thus recognized the import of the word
"assistant" in the sixth amendment, pointing out that if counsel is
forced on a defendant, the concept of assistance is lost and the right
to personally make the defense is "stripped of the personal
character upon which the amendment insists." ' The concept of
"assistance" and the personal character of the right are lost if the
defendant cannot decide for himself how much assistance he will
receive-if he cannot choose a hybrid defense.'"
Under the all-or-nothing approach to the use of counsel, subject
to the judge's discretion,"' the defendant, if he does not wish to pro-
ceed entirely on his own, can be forced to acquiesce in full represen-
tation by counsel. In this situation the attorney can no longer be
said to be an assistant. When forced into a choice between pro-
143. Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279 (1942).
144. 422 U.S. at 819.
145. Contra, United States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d 271, 276 (2d Cir. 1964) (describ-
ing the two rights as "two faces of the same coin").
146. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975). The Court made these
statements in the context of whether counsel may be forced on an accused.
147. Id.
148. See Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692 (1974).
149. The ambiguity of this proposition is reflected in two cases from the Se-
cond Circuit, United States v. Wolfish, 525 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 1059 (1976); and United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). The
Wolfish court read § 1654 as statutorily prohibiting a hybrid defense, while the Swin-
ton court held the question to be subject to the trial court's discretion.
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ceeding pro se and having counsel present the defense, the defen-
dant may acquiesce to full representation. From a practical stand-
point, however, the "choice" is not really his, and it then becomes
questionable whether the defense is his."
Even if 28 U.S.C. § 1654 is relevant to the hybrid defense ques-
tion it appears to have been improperly applied by the federal
courts. Assuming arguendo that federal courts may properly rely on
§ 1654 when presented with the question of the constitutional right
to present a hybrid defense, it seems reasonable that the statute
should be applied according to its precise wording. The statute says
that an accused may proceed "personally or by counsel .... ,,151 A
reasonable interpretation of this phrase would seem to leave no
room for judicial discretion beyond the "either-or" application.
Under this analysis a hybrid defense-combining the right to defend
pro se with the right to assistance of counsel-might then be
specifically forbidden by § 1654. If § 1654 does forbid hybrid
representation then a defendant should always be precluded from
presenting this type of defense since the statute creates no excep-
tion. However, this is not the position taken by the vast majority of
courts.
The general rule is that hybrid representation is not constitu-
tionally protected and that the question is for the determination of
the trial court in its discretion."' If the trial court allows the accus-
ed to present a hybrid defense the apparent mandate of the statute
will not be given effect. Citing § 1654 as support for the present
rule and allowing the trial judge to make the final determination of
the question, leaves the system in the inconsistent and curious posi-
tion of allowing the application of an apparent statutory mandate to
be subject to the whim of the trial judge. Even if § 1654 was given
complete effect by forcing an all-or-nothing choice on the accused
the operation of the statute may deny him his constitutional rights
in another manner.
Under the present hybrid defense rule a defendant's sixth
amendment right to make his own defense may be burdened when
he is required under § 1654 to choose between asserting his pro se
right and asserting his right to counsel. Supreme Court holdings in
150. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821 (1975).
151. 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970).
152. See notes 18-46 supra and accompanying text.
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other contexts indicate that one should not have to forego one con-
stitutional right in order to meaningfully assert another.",
In Simmons v. United States '" the Supreme Court held that
testimony given for the purpose of asserting a fourth amendment
claim could not be used for the purpose of incriminating the defen-
dant unless he makes no objection. Under any other rule a condition
would be imposed upon a defendant which may deter him from
asserting a fourth amendment objection-the condition being that
his testimony would later be admissible over his claim of fifth
amendment protection."' Courts in the past had said that the defen-
dant might refuse to testify, thereby possibly foregoing his fourth
amendment right, to gain the fifth amendment's "benefit." However,
the Supreme Court in Simmons would not allow this procedure,
noting that whiere the "benefit" to be gained "is that afforded by
another provision of the Bill of Rights, an undesirable tension is
created." 5'
This principle was apparently later limited in McGautha v.
California.57 Recognizing that the criminal process "is replete with
situations requiring 'the making of difficult judgments' as to which
course to follow,"' " the Court in McGautha stated the issue in terms
of "whether compelling the election impairs to any appreciable ex-
tent any of the policies behind the rights involved." ' If § 1654 is
strictly applied to a hybrid request the same type of dilemma
criticized in Simmons may occur.
The Supreme Court in Faretta v. California" found the right
to proceed pro se to be implicit in the sixth amendment as a
whole."'1 The right to the assistance of counsel, on the other hand, is
153. The Court in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963), overturned a lower
court ruling which forced the appellant to choose between following her religious
beliefs and abandoning her beliefs in order to accept work. Id. at 403. The appellant
was denied unemployment compensation under South Carolina law because her
religious beliefs would not allow her to work on Saturday. Forcing the appellant to
make this choice constituted an undue burden on her religious beliefs, in violation of
her first amendment right. Id at 404. This principle is applicable to the hybrid
representation issue. Forcing the defendant to forego either his pro se right or his
right to counsel, so that he may assert the other, places an undue burden on his sixth
amendment rights.
154. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
155. Id. at 393.
156. Id. at 394.
157. 402 U.S. 183 (1971).
158. Id. at 213.
159. Id.
160. 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
161. Id. at 817, 819.
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explicit in the amendment.1 2 If it follows that the two rights are
thus independent then the policies behind the rights may be im-
paired if § 1654 is applied to force the accused to forego one or the
other. If § 1654 is strictly applied the defendant who actually wishes
to present a hybrid defense may waive his pro se right and allow
counsel to present the defense. The policy behind the pro se
right-that the defense should be personal to the accused'"-might
then be impaired. Where the defendant chooses to represent himself
the policy behind the right to counsel-that the accused, like the
government, is entitled to representation by an expert-will be im-
paired. By compelling a choice between proceeding with counsel or
pro se, § 1654 vitiates the policies underlying the rights involved.
It may be argued that the nature of these two rights is such
that they are not really independent. While the principle of Sim-
mons v. United States'" would then not apply to the hybrid defense
question this would not destroy the case for the hybrid defense. A
finding that the right to counsel and the right to defend pro se are
not independent, supports the conclusion that the hybrid defense
should be viewed as merely one method of exercising the sixth
amendment right to make a defense 5
It is clear that past and present interpretations of § 1654 and
the sixth amendment have unnecessarily given rise to a tension be-
tween the two provisions. Arguably, § 1654 should be considered in-
applicable to a hybrid defense request. The Faretta case has effec-
tively made it inappropriate to consider that statute with respect to
the question of whether an accused may present a hybrid defense. It
has also been shown that even if § 1654 remains applicable its
language does not necessarily merit an either-or reading. Supreme
Court interpretations of the sixth amendment indicate that such a
reading is in fact incorrect. Furthermore, a strict either-or approach
under § 1654 would force the defendant to forego the assertion of
one constitutional right in order to assert another.
The Hybrid Defense Under State Constitutions
Because the wording of the state constitutional provisions
under consideration differs from the language of the sixth amend-
ment, a different analysis of the hybrid defense issue under these
162. "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have
the Assistance of Counsel for this defense." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
163. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 819-20 (1975).
164. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
165. See notes 118-21 supra and accompanying text.
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state provisions must be made. Article one, section thirteen of the
Indiana Constitution states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accus-
ed shall have the right . . . to be heard by himself and counsel."'"
Twenty-five other states guarantee an individual this right in
similar language."7 Six states afford constitutional protection for the
individual's right to be heard by himself, by counsel, or both.'"
Under language of either type of provision the right in these states
to present a hybrid defense would seem to be guaranteed. However,
all but one of these jurisdictions have interpreted their respective
provisions to mean that a defendant may represent himself or be
represented by counsel, but not both. This section presents an ex-
amination of the effect of these state constitutional provisions on
the hybrid representation issue.
In McDowell v. State' the Indiana Supreme Court was
presented with the issue whether a defendant who is represented
by counsel may volunteer incompetent and irrelevant testimony or
ask questions while testifying. The appellant claimed that the trial
court, by refusing this course of action, denied the appellant the
right to be heard by himself. This right was apparently claimed
under article one, section thirteen of the Indiana Constitution. The
court, without distinguishing or explaining the constitutional provi-
sion, held that "[t]hese situations were for the exercise of the court's
discretion in controlling the trial and seeing to it that the trial pro-
gressed in an orderly manner."' 7 It is not certain if the court meant
to confine this holding to situations where the defendant offers ir-
relevant and incompetent testimony. Clearly the judge must have
control over the trial and the presentation of testimony regardless
of the type of defense presented. Yet the holding in McDowell does
not preclude a finding of a right to present a hybrid defense under
section thirteen of the Indiana Constitution. Dictum from the opin-
ion seemingly recognizes hybrid representation under this provi-
sion.' Subsequent Indiana decisions have not faced this issue but
have held, consistent with the general rule, that no federal constitu-
tional right to a hybrid defense exists. 7
166. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
167. See note 53 supra.
168. See note 54 supra.
169. 225 Ind. 495, 76 N.E.2d 249 (1947).
170. 225 Ind. at 502, 76 N.E.2d at 252.
171. See notes 50-51 supra and accompanying text.
172. Bradberry v. State, - Ind. - , 364 N.E.2d 1183 (1977); Wallace v.
State, - Ind. App. - , 361 N.E.2d 159, petition for transfer denied, Ind. -'
366 N.E.2d 1176 (1977) (Pivarnik, J., dissenting).
1978]
et al.: The Accused as Co-Counsel: The Case for the Hybrid Defense
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1978
362 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12
Other jurisdictions when presented with a claim of a right to
hybrid representation under state constitutional provisions have
denied the claim by relying partially on policy reasoning and partial-
ly on distinguishing interpretations of the provisions themselves.
The Tennessee Supreme Court in State v. Burkhart"" considered the
fact that the constitutional provision is worded conjunctively7 " to be
of no consequence. The court explained the provision by pointing out
that at the time the provision was drafted the accused had no right
to testify in his own behalf. Essentially the court construed the
word "heard" to mean that a defendant may testify and that he may
also be represented by counsel. The court further held that the
hybrid representation question rests with the discretion of the trial
court, based upon a compelling policy "of maintaining an orderly ad-
ministration of justice."'1 5
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals took a similar approach
to the hybrid defense issue. In Landers v. State7 " the court cited
decisions from other jurisdictions to support its finding that the
Texas Constitution 7 does not protect hybrid representation. Utiliz-
ing a rational similar to that in Burkhart, " the Texas court held
that the constitutional provision guaranteeing a "right of being
heard by himself or counsel, or both" gives the accused the right to
testify and the right to have counsel, but does not recognize a right
to present a hyrbid defense.'7
There would seem to be even more solid ground for recognizing
a hybrid representation right under this type of state constitutional
provision than under the federal constitution. Based on McDowell v.
173. - Tenn. __ , 541 S.W.2d 365 (1976).
174. "[T]he accused hath the right to be heard by himself and his counsel."
TENN. CONST. art. 1, § 9 [emphasis added).
175. State v. Burkhart, - Tenn. - , 541 S.W.2d 365, 370 (1976). See State
v. McCleary, 149 N.J. Super. 77, 373 A.2d 400 (1977).
176. 550 S.W.2d 272 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (opinion on state's motion for
rehearing).
177. TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
178. See note 173 supra.
179. 550 S.W.2d at 277. The conviction in Landers was originally reversed by
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. In this opinion the court quoted at length from
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and concluded that "[the denial of appellant's
timely and properly presented request for his constitutional right to personally cross-
examine witnesses against him" presented reversible error. Landers v. State, 550
S.W.2d 272, 275 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (reversed on rehearing). However, the court
granted the state's motion for a rehearing and subsequently reversed itself by affirm-
ing the conviction. The second majority opinion stated that the opinion on original sub-
mission had misconstrued article one, section ten of the Texas Constitution. 550
S.W.2d at 275 (opinion on state's motion for rehearing).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 12, No. 2 [1978], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol12/iss2/4
HYBRID DEFENSE
State" the question has not been completely resolved under current
interpretations of the Indiana Constitution."8 ' If the Indiana courts,
like those of Tennessee and Texas, are able to explain away the sur-
face implications of article one, section thirteen, then it appears like-
ly that Indiana will also find no constitutional grounds for present-
ing a hybrid defense and will leave the matter to the trial court's
discretion.
The approach taken by the Texas and Tennessee courts was
strongly criticized in the dissenting opinion in Landers v. State."2
Referring to the seemingly clear language of article one, section ten
of the Texas Constitution, the dissent stated:
Under no possible construction of the English language as
it has ever existed can one construe the term "heard" in
the above Constitutional provision to have different mean-
ings as to the terms "himself, or counsel, or both." Would
the majority interpret this provision as guaranteeing
defense counsel the right to testify? It is inconsistent to
interpret "heard" to mean "the right to testify" when ap-
plied to the accused, while interpreting "heard" as "the
right to conduct a defense" when applied to counsel.'"
This discussion reveals the difficulty involved in holding that hybrid
representation is not protected under state constitutional provisions
which set down representation rights in conjunctive terms. The
courts are indeed straining to say that "heard"'" means "testify"
and "present a defense" in the same sentence, depending upon
which phrase-"by himself" or "by counsel" - it is applied to.
A state such as Indiana which has a constitutional provision
guaranteeing a right in the accused to be heard by himself and
counsel, should not have to reach the policy considerations behind
the question when faced with the hybrid representation issue. The
plain words of the provisions guarantee the right to present a
hybrid defense.
CONCLUSION
Federal and state courts have refused to recognize a constitu-
tionally protected right to present a hybrid defense. General policy
180. See note 169 supra.
181. See notes 169-71 supra and accompanying text.
182. 550 S.W.2d at 280 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
183. Id at 281.
184. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
1978]
et al.: The Accused as Co-Counsel: The Case for the Hybrid Defense
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1978
364 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol.12
considerations do not support the present rule denying hybrid
defenses, and in fact warrant a finding of constitutional protection
for the hybrid defense. The system's goal of retaining reliability of
the guilt-determining process through insuring an orderly trial
would not be threatened and can be achieved by recognizing a
hybrid defense right. A hybrid defense would not unnecessarily con-
sume time or detract from the dignity and decorum of the pro-
ceedings or make the proceedings less efficient. A pro se defense
would be more likely to give rise to any of these harmful results.
Thus when it is remembered that the pro se right is constitutionally
protected under Faretta, justifying a denial of a right to hybrid
representation on any of these grounds lacks validity.
Recognition of a right to present a hybrid defense would also
help achieve the goal of insuring procedural fairness to the in-
dividual accused. Procedural fairness in the context of presenting a
defense is best achieved by respecting the accused's freedom of
choice. The importance of the defendant's freedom of choice as ex-
pressed in the Bill of Rights and protected by the United States
Supreme Court, indicates the accused should have, under the sixth
amendment, the freedom to choose a hybrid defense.
Some federal courts have chosen to rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1654 in
determining that the sixth amendment does not protect hybrid
representation, while others have denied the right based on policy
considerations and Supreme Court interpretations of the amend-
ment. Jurisdictions having constitutional provisions which appear to
guarantee the accused a right to be heard by himself and counsel
have also refused to recognize a hybrid defense right. Faretta v.
California, which recognized an independent sixth amendment pro se
right, has been considered to be of no bearing on the hybrid defense
question, and most courts, both state and federal, have held that a
hybrid defense request is for the determination of the trial court.
As has been shown, § 1654 should not be applied to the hybrid
representation issue. The right to represent oneself and the right to
the assistance of counsel have separate bases in the sixth amend-
ment, and should therefore not be considered to be correlative in
nature. The Supreme Court's finding of an independent pro se right
should preclude application of § 1654 to the hybrid defense question.
Even if the statute does control the issue it has been misap-
plied by federal courts. In spite of the statute's mandatory wording
courts have held the question to be subject to the trial judge's
discretion. If the statute has been accurately construed as requiring
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an either-or choice between self-representation and representation
by counsel, the judge's discretion should not be determinative.
State constitutional provisions which guarantee a right to self-
representation and to have counsel should be held to guarantee a
right to present a hybrid defense. These provisions facially protect
such a right, and the judge's discretion should thus not be controll-
ing when considering a request for hybrid representation.
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